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NINETEEN FIFTY-EIGHT WAS AN EXTRAORDINARY YEAR for innovations in
the arts and in the sciences. This essay examines the ways in which those
innovations were driven by developments in the formal theory of infor-
mation. The developments in information theory facilitated the rapid
growth of computational technologies. They also provided new foun-
dations, and new explanatory ideals, for linguistics, for psychology, and for
the human sciences more generally. They thereby put pressure on estab-
lished conceptions of human creativity and culture. In the natural sciences
and in mathematics there were logical results (from the philosophy of
science and from metamathematics) that enabled this pressure to be used
in generating a positive new conception of the way in which mathematical
and scientific enterprises require an essentially cultural form of human
creativity. The literary arts had no analogous results with which to
operate. The pressure on established conceptions of human creativity was
therefore felt by authors and critics in the form of an urgent anxiety
which, as the concluding sections of this essay show, can be seen manifest-
ing itself in the novels, plays, and critical disputes of the period. The links
between formal theories of information and the conception of creativity
are at their closest in the science of linguistics. It is there that the
innovations of 1958 begin.
I
Noam Chomsky’s 1959 review of B. F. Skinner’s 1957 book Verbal Behavior
would not have dealt such a devastating blow to Skinner’s behaviourist
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research programme had Chomsky’s own 1957 work, Syntactic Structures,
not shown that intellectual resources were then in place that allowed the
cognitivist alternative to behaviourism to be pursued fruitfully. These new
intellectual resources provided the foundations for Chomsky’s project in
linguistics and, then as now, they provided the foundations for cognitive
psychology more generally. They were partly the result of research that
was concerned with the pursuit of logical and technological innovations,
but – as I aim to show here – they were also related closely to
innovations in the arts.
On the logical and technological side, the new intellectual resources
were those of information theory, as developed by Claude Shannon, and
of computation theory, as developed by Alan Turing, John von Neumann,
and others. On the artistic side, they arose from a reappraisal of
modernist conceptions of individual creativity and of culture, and from a
reappraisal of the relationship between these things and the inheritance of
a tradition.
These two reappraisals were especially well represented in England,
where their impact could be seen in the theatrical innovations of the
English Stage Company (then newly founded at the Royal Court
Theatre), could be felt in analytic philosophy (especially in those parts of
it that took up themes from the later work of Wittgenstein), and could be
discerned in several changes in society at large (especially in changing
attitudes to politics, to protest, and to satire).
In what follows I give an account of some of the more prominent
among these cultural developments, with a view to showing how they
were related to the logical and technological developments with which
they coincided. I hope thereby to show that the development of
cognitivism in psychology and linguistics was part of a large-scale cultural
renegotiation that took place at the end of the 1950s, with its epicentre
in 1958.
It has been noted previously that there might be some story to be
told about the relationship of linguistics to culture more broadly.
Chomsky himself has often suggested that there were cultural factors, as
well as scientific ones, that contributed to the reception of his proposals
about generative grammar, but I am not here looking to culture in an
attempt to identify the efficient cause for Chomsky’s revolutionary influ-
ence on linguistics. My position is, rather, the contrary. The cultural
developments that I shall be considering here took place over so con-
densed a timescale, and the developments in linguistics took place over
so prolonged a period, that it cannot simply be the case that Chomsky’s
effect on linguistics reflected a prior cultural shift. The central ideas of
Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, of Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures, and of
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Chomsky’s 1959 review of Skinner’s book, were all conceived well
before any of those works came to publication. The central parts of
Skinner’s discussion had had an influential life in mimeograph form
long before their eventual publication, and Skinner himself, in the
preface to his book, traces the gestation of his central ideas over a
period of more than twenty years. Chomsky, for his part, tells us that
his complaints against Skinner’s project were a long-standing concern,
and that he ‘actually wrote the review before the book was published’.
In contrast to the prolonged development of these ideas about language
and linguistics, the cultural and artistic developments that I shall be
reviewing here took place remarkably quickly.
They also ranged over a remarkably broad field: the year 1958 saw
innovations in social realist theatre, in nouvelle vague cinema, in
modal jazz, in poetry, in moral philosophy, in developmental psychol-
ogy, in sociology (especially in its relations to social psychology and to
anthropology), and in the scientific study of workplace organisation.
Only some of these innovations are discussed below, but all of them
exerted an influence on our perception of the individual and of indi-
vidual creativity. All took place in the year after the publication of
Chomsky’s and Skinner’s books and before the appearance of
Chomsky’s review. What we seem to have had, then, is a widespread
cultural shift for which structuralist linguistics was the avant-garde.
This essay is an attempt to understand how such a thing could have
happened.
II
My claim that the literary and artistic developments of 1958 were
animated by the technical and scientific developments that character-
ised linguistics in this period is one that, as with any claim about
intimate connections between distinct cultural phenomena, requires
us to strike a balance. In order to understand the terms in which
this claim is stated, we must understand there to be a distinction
between the two sorts of cultural phenomena that are in question.
But the claim itself threatens to undermine that distinction, by telling
us that the events on either side of it were not really all that distinct.
Nowadays, the drawing and collapsing of such distinctions is so
much a part of our intellectual stock-in-trade that we are all of us
adept at striking the requisite balance. To us it seems quite natural
to assume, at least as a working hypothesis, that the mutual influ-
ences between scientific and artistic intellectual developments may
have been sufficiently strong for it to be explanatorily revealing to
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view each in the context of the other. We routinely assume such
things without thereby denying that each development had a logic
and a life of its own. But such hypotheses did not always enjoy their
current levels of prima facie plausibility. The sociological understand-
ing of science on which this plausibility depends was itself a product
of the intellectual developments that were in contention in the years
that concern us here.
That understanding had begun to emerge with Robert Merton’s work
in the late 1930s, and continued to be developed in articles that he pub-
lished throughout the 1940s and 1950s. In a rather piecemeal fashion,
this work applied the methods of sociology to the social practices and
norms of scientists. By the end of the 1950s Merton was beginning to
regard this piecemeal approach as unduly tentative. He begins his
August 1957 presidential address to the American Sociological Society –
diagnosing the prestige attached to scientific priority – by suggesting that
the theorists of the future ‘will doubtless find it strange that so few sociol-
ogists (and historians) of the twentieth century could bring themselves,
in their work, to treat science as one of the great social institutions of the
time’.
Although Merton may have been right to say that, among the
American sociologists of 1957, there were rather few theorists who
were treating science as a social institution, he was certainly premature
in predicting that this attitude would come to seem distinctive of soci-
ologists (and historians) for the whole of the twentieth century. In fact,
it turned out that those few of Merton’s contemporaries who were
treating science as a social institution were doing so in a way that
would prove to be extraordinarily influential. It was at the time when
Merton was lamenting the lack of sociological treatments of science,
and especially in 1958 – the year following Merton’s address – that
Thomas Kuhn was most concertedly at work in articulating the philo-
sophical picture that emerges when one regards science in the socio-
logically informed way that Merton was advocating. It was in that
same year that Michael Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge was published, pro-
viding what continues to be the most thoroughly elaborated account in
which the progress of science is understood as a social phenomenon,
and so in ways that differ markedly from the positivistic account that
had, until then, been the received view. And it was in these same
years that Sir Charles Snow first presented the picture of scientific and
literary culture that his 1959 Rede lecture, on ‘The Two Cultures and
The Scientific Revolution’, would establish as a locus of famously
high-profile controversy.
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III
The most frequently noted feature of the cultural background against
which each of these works was received is the postwar emergence of the
United States as a centre of artistic and scientific activity, with its concomi-
tant questions about the ways in which the American sciences and arts
differed from their European predecessors. As Chomsky has remarked, in
a relatively recent interview:
In the 1950s, after World War II, there was a rather unusual period
in the United States. The US was the richest country in the world
before the war and it had been for a long time, but intellectually and
culturally it was kind of backwards. If you wanted to study physics
you went to Germany, if you wanted to study philosophy you went to
England, if you wanted to be a writer or an artist, France. Being in
the United States was like being in central Idaho today. It was not the
intellectual and cultural center by any means. It was also not the
major political force; it was in its own region but not a global player,
like Britain, let’s say. But that all changed with World War II . . . the
US emerged far richer than it had been . . . And there was a period
of triumphalism about what those bad old Europeans weren’t doing
properly and we had to tell them: now we are going to run the world
intellectually as well, culturally as well.1
By 1958 this cultural emergence of the US seemed, rather suddenly, to be
a completed action rather than an ongoing process. This was particularly
clear in the popular arts, where America’s emergence had been most con-
spicuous. Nineteen fifty-eight was the year in which Jerry Lee Lewis aban-
doned touring and was blacklisted from radio (after it emerged that he
had married his 13-year-old cousin in December of the previous year). It
was the year in which Marilyn Monroe made her last successful movie
(Some Like It Hot). And it was the year in which Elvis Presley’s most pro-
ductive run of filming and recording was stayed, first by his being con-
scripted to the military (in March), and then by the death of his mother
(in August). In the high arts too, the first phase of the transatlantic cultural
relocation seemed to have drawn rather abruptly to a close: Jackson
Pollock was dead – he had died in 1956 – and Ezra Pound no longer
looked like a force to be reckoned with: his literary essays being complete
enough to have been collected in 1954, he was enough of a spent force in
1 J. Virue´s-Ortega, ‘The Case against B. F. Skinner 45 Years Later: An
Encounter with N. Chomsky’, Behavior Analyst, 29/2 (2006) p. 243.
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1958 to be discharged from St Elizabeth’s hospital in the April of that
year.
In England, the attempts of poetry to find a postwar voice seemed,
equally abruptly, to have stalled. Robert Conquest’s 1956 anthology, New
Lines – like D. J. Enright’s 1955 Poets of the 1950s – was taken at the time
of its publication to contain the first pronouncements of an emerging new
movement in English poetry but, as Conquest’s introduction to his volume
explains, it was only the rejection of past principles that gave his
anthology its unity, not any positive agenda shared by the poets whose
work was collected there:
It will be seen at once that these poets do not have as much in
common as they would if they were a group of doctrine-saddled
writers forming a definite school complete with programme and
rules. What they have in common is perhaps, at its lowest, little more
than a negative determination to avoid bad principles.2
None of the members of the movement represented in Conquest’s and
Enright’s anthologies identified very strongly with it. It was outsiders who
dubbed it ‘The Movement’, and only they who gave it a capital M. By
1958 – with Thom Gunn having relocated to San Francisco, with
Kingsley Amis in Princeton (writing mainly about science fiction), with
Donald Davie looking more like a critic than a poet, and with Philip
Larkin writing little and publishing less – only an optimistic onlooker
would have thought that poetry in England was moving, as Conquest had
claimed, in the direction of ‘a genuine and healthy poetry of the new
period’.3
The Second World War and the subsequent emergence of the US may
have been the most prominent causes of the prevailing sense that we had
entered a new period, with new challenges of a sort that were causing
English poetry to stall, but there was also a more abstract group of pro-
blems, unrelated to the war, that raised a more foundational challenge, not
only for poetry, but for the attempt to limn the modern mind more gener-
ally. These problems were not only holding up modern poetry, they were
consanguineous with those that Elizabeth Anscombe told us ought to have
been holding up moral philosophy. At the beginning of her 1958 article
‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ she was characteristically adamant in declar-
ing that ‘it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that
2 Robert Conquest, New Lines (London 1956) p. xv.
3 Ibid., p. xi.
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should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of
psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’.4 In previous years
Anscombe’s declaration that philosophers had failed to accurately picture
human psychology might have rung in poets’ ears as a call to arms. In
1958 the result was anxiety, and not merely artistic concern, because the
task of finding this ‘conspicuously lacking’ psychological picture was now
being approached – with radically unfamiliar tools, newly appropriated
from the still nascent discipline of communication theory – by Chomsky
in psycholinguistics, and by Donald Broadbent and others in what would
eventually become cognitive psychology. Their work, and the work of their
several peers in other human sciences, broke with a decades-long tradition
in which all the most interesting questions about psychology were left to
practitioners of disciplines that were in sympathy with the literary arts.
This tradition had established itself in the English-speaking world
around the beginning of the twentieth century when – for reasons that
were partly to do with logical positivism, but that also had to do with
psychology’s desire to establish its credentials as an empirical science – all
the most interesting mental phenomena were dropped from the exper-
imental psychologist’s research agenda. Questions about the constitution
of the conscious self were either referred out to the more speculation-
tolerant discipline of anthropology, or else they were deliberately ignored
by the ‘objective psychology’ that studied only outwardly manifest
behaviour. If, in the first half of the twentieth century, one wanted to
know about the mental phenomena that feature in our experience of
ourselves as the agents of actions and decisions, one turned not to the
empirical sciences of the mind but to those disciplines such as Freudian
psychoanalysis, that employed more hermeneutic methods than
experimental psychology would allow itself.
By 1958 the case for this division of labour had collapsed. Broadbent’s
1958 book Perception and Communication made the first sustained and author-
itative attack on the positivists’ idea that the scientific method required
one to remain silent about the inner occurrences of psychology. It did so
by showing how the mathematical theory of communication and infor-
mation could be used to systematise one’s thinking about those inner
occurrences. It was these same theoretical resources (although with a
greater emphasis on computation) that were at work in Chomsky’s 1957
treatment of the psychological basis of language, and again in his 1959
attack on Skinner’s behaviourism.
4 Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy, 33/1 (1958)
p. 1.
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Both Chomsky and Broadbent treated these new theoretical resources
cautiously. The role played by communication theory in Chomsky’s
Syntactic Structures was not, in the first place, that of providing the vocabu-
lary for a positive claim about human language, but only of enabling a
negative claim, concerning the inadequacy of behaviourism’s ‘conception
of language as a Markov Process’,5 to be formulated precisely. The same
wariness about the overselling of communication theory can be seen in
Broadbent’s work. In his opening chapter, Broadbent characterises the
‘current popularity of language derived from communication theory for
the statement of psychological problems’ as ‘a purely linguistic device,
which by itself will not provide the answer to the problems of psychology’.
In making this assessment Broadbent was explicitly echoing Richard
Gregory, in whose work information theory was being used to model the
limits of visual perception (whereas Broadbent himself focused more or
less exclusively on audition). He was also echoing a sentiment that had
been expressed by Claude Shannon, whose seminal paper ‘A
Mathematical Theory of Communication’ had single-handedly established
the field of information theory a decade earlier.6 In a short 1956 note,
published under the title ‘The Bandwagon’, Shannon cautioned those
who hoped to apply information theory more broadly that:
Seldom do more than a few of nature’s secrets give way at one time.
It will be all too easy for our somewhat artificial prosperity to collapse
overnight when it is realized that the use of a few exciting words like
information, entropy, redundancy, do not solve all our problems . . . workers
in other fields should realize that the basic results of the subject are
aimed in a very specific direction, a direction that is not necessarily
relevant to such fields as psychology, economics and other social
sciences.7
Shannon nonetheless went on to admit that he was himself optimistic
about the deployment of information theory in psychology, economics,
and the other social sciences – ‘I personally believe that many of the
concepts of information theory will prove useful in these other fields’ –
and, as Broadbent notes, even if the contribution of information theory to
psychology consisted only of ‘a few exciting words’, then, nonetheless,
5 Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (The Hague 1957) p. 34.
6 Claude Shannon, ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’, Bell Systems
Technical Journal, 27/379–423 (1948).
7 Claude Shannon, ‘The Bandwagon’, IRE Transactions on Information Theory, 3
(1956) p. 3.
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these ‘new vocabularies do involve some shift in basic assumptions’: the
vocabulary of information theory – just by virtue of its being a purely
formal theory, in which argument proceeds by mathematical deduction –
involved a shift in basic assumptions about the way in which psychological
explanation is to be achieved.
The earlier tradition of psychological thinking aspired to explanations
with a form that poetry could use and that literary criticism could engage
with. It aspired to make mental and social phenomena intelligible by giving
an account of them with virtues that were at least analogous to the virtues of
narrative coherence and cogency. The effect of Broadbent’s and Chomsky’s
importation of communication theory into psychology was to enable exper-
imental psychology to return to aspects of the mind that run deeper than
mere behaviour, but to do so with new standards of explanatory adequacy,
having none of the hermeneutic fecundity of their predecessors.
The explanations of the new psychology were not the reductive expla-
nations that were thought to be distinctive of the natural sciences (at least
according to the then dominant view articulated by Ernest Nagel8). If
they had been simply that then – ‘reductionism’ having been established
as a term of intellectual abuse some years previously – the opponents of
the cognitivist turn that Chomsky and Broadbent were taking would have
been ready with a still familiar rhetoric of dismissiveness. But the new psy-
chology was not reductive. It was not seeking to ground psychology in
biology, chemistry, or physics. Instead it proceeded with the formal expla-
natory resources that put psychology on an abstract grounding drawn, not
from the lower-level sciences, but from mathematics.
Just as this cognitivist approach was displacing hermeneutics from its
place in the production of psychological explanations, so the tradition of
poetry that had emerged from a more or less Freudian concern with the
handling of symbols was beginning to seem a spent to be.
This is explicitly noted in Donald Davie’s 1956 critique of T. S. Eliot’s
Four Quartets, and it is noted with a conspicuous display of ambivalence:
Davie concludes his treatment of Eliot’s Quartets by expressing the hope
that the era of ‘post-symbolist poetry’ was over, but, as in Conquest’s
anthology from that same year, Davie makes no attempt to find terms
with which to articulate the principles by which a new era of poetry
might be guided. In the absence of such terms, his optimism more or less
declares itself to be groundless:
8 Ernest Nagel, ‘The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences’, in Science
and Civilization (Madison, Wis. 1949) pp. 99–138.
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If I hope for a different sort of poetry, that hope is reasonably confident
– not because I give much weight to the younger poets of today who,
when they think in these terms at all (they seldom do), declare the post-
symbolist tradition is ‘worked out’; nor even because the respectable
poetry written in England and America by poets younger than Eliot is
plainly not written according to his prescription; but simply because
the Four Quartets represent a stage of such subtlety and intricacy in the
post-symbolist tradition that it is impossible to think of its ever being
taken a stage further . . . It is, at any rate, in this hope and this confi-
dence of something quite different in the offing, that I have written the
second half of my title: ‘T. S. Eliot: The End of an Era’.9
It is telling that the Four Quartets remained, in 1956, the last landmark relative
to which Davie thought the poets of his generation could orient themselves.
Much had happened in the years since the publication of the quartets (in
1936, 1940, 1941, and, as a single volume, in 1942). It was not only that the
war had ended, nor only that America, as we have seen, had gained but was
no longer gaining a cultural status that it had not previously enjoyed. There
had also been a very great deal of more mundane social innovation, affecting
the quotidian interactions between the individual and the apparatus of
culture, especially in England: television had become established as a
popular medium, the BBC’s monopoly on broadcasting had been broken,
and a new wave of red brick universities had been founded. Received
wisdom about the composition of the English cultural establishment had
thereby been undermined. New terms needed to be found with which to
debate the basis on which one could claim the authority to make pronounce-
ments, whether in verse or prose, about the significance of literature to the
still emerging postwar society. Eliot, as Davie indicates, had previously been
endowed with such authority. But in 1958 his claim on it was sufficiently
unclear that Robert Graves could be sniffy about its basis:
the Cultural Establishments both of the United States and the United
Kingdom, feel ashamed that the present era of rapid material and scien-
tific progress has been glorified by no bearded bard of Whitman’s
stature, or Tennyson’s. They cast around for a name to fill the gap, pre-
ferably one approved by the younger intellectuals. Pound is not politi-
cally respectable, but what about T. S. Eliot? The Wasteland has been
their beacon for the last thirty years, and Eliot’s record is academically
9 Donald Davie, ‘T. S. Eliot: The End of an Era’, 1956 p. 24, reprinted in his
Modernist Essays: Yeats Pound, Eliot (Manchester 2004).
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clean: he unsaid his harsh judgment of Milton, and cannot be accused
of writing any love poems since his school days. True, The Wasteland is
not really a long poem, or even a long short poem, but a collage of
lyrical and dramatic pieces . . . However, Eliot’s Four Quartets, taken in a
lump, are lengthy enough and adult enough and religious enough and
philosophical enough to pass as a masterpiece. So the Four Quartets (‘with
The Wasteland taken into consideration,’ as the courtroom reporters put
it) have elevated Eliot into a major poet.10
Graves was no doubt indulging his taste for controversy when he said
this, and it is perhaps significant that when he published it (in a collec-
tion of his various writings timed for the 1958 Christmas market) he
positioned this talk so that it appears immediately after one in which
Eliot is treated rather more admiringly, thereby breaking what would
otherwise have been a chronological ordering. Whether or not Graves
intended that juxtaposition to be mitigating, the fact that he said these
things at all, and the fact that he printed them in a popular and well-
received book, is all the more telling because their inaccuracy would
have been obvious. By 1958 Eliot himself had long since ceased to make
any claims to precedence as a cultural critic of the sort that Graves was
envisioning.
Nowhere in Eliot’s later prose does he cast himself in the role that
Graves was then suggesting the ‘Cultural Establishments of the United
States and United Kingdom’ had assigned to him: the ‘glorifying’ of the
‘present era of rapid material and scientific progress’. Of course Eliot was
aware of such progress as relevant to the poet’s business. But it is hard to
believe that Graves seriously thought that anyone in the cultural establish-
ment regarded the writing of ‘The Waste Land’ as a qualification for the
role of society’s glorifier. Eliot was never much inclined to glorify any
social phenomena as profane as the ‘material and scientific progress’ that
Graves mentions, and by 1958 he was not much concerned with attempt-
ing to address anything as inchoate (or as profane) as what Graves calls
‘the present era’. It is true that Eliot’s 1956 volume On Poetry and Poets rep-
rints his 1945 attempts to gauge ‘the social function of poetry in its largest
sense’ in which Eliot tells us that poetry may make a difference ‘to the
speech, to the sensibility, to the lives of all the members of the community,
to the whole people, whether they read or enjoy poetry or not: even, in
fact, whether they know the names of their greatest poets or not’.11
10 Robert Graves, Steps (London 1958) p. 115.
11 T. S. Eliot, On Poetry and Poets (London 1956) p. 22.
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But On Poetry and Poets also reprints Eliot’s 1936 ‘harsh judgment’ of
Milton, together with the sequel which Graves satirically characterised as
Eliot’s attempt to unsay that judgement. It is therefore clear that Eliot’s
intention in publishing On Poetry and Poets was to archive, rather than to
reassert, the claims of the essays that he collected there. None of the
essays in On Poetry and Poets that date from after the war make any claims
about broader social functions for poetry. They are much concerned with
literary contexts, but not with any social contexts broader than that of the
university.
This shift away from the war work of presenting and solemnising
cultural identities was (like the shift in his attitude to Milton) presented by
Eliot himself as a consequence of changing circumstances, not as a
change of mind. In the brief preface added to the 1962 edition of his
1948 Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, when Eliot tells us that he finds
the persistence of his stance regarding that book’s themes to be remark-
able, his point is not to suggest that culture had held fast, so that what
had been true of it in 1948 remained true in 1962. His point is quite the
opposite. The most confidently struck note, among the caveats and cau-
tions that introduce the volume, is the claim that culture, as Eliot had
understood it, is no longer a guiding principle for the society in which he
was writing: ‘We can assert with some confidence that our own period is
one of decline; that the standards of culture are lower than they were fifty
years ago; and that the evidences of this decline are visible in every
department of human activity’. Eliot’s 1962 preface was suggesting, not
that culture in the interim had held its ground, but that this decline had
continued. Nothing is added to modify the pessimism, or the resilience, in
Eliot’s 1948 judgement: ‘I see no reason why . . . we may not even antici-
pate a period, of some duration, of which it is possible to say that it will
have no culture. Then culture will have to grow again from the soil.12
When the essays republished in Notes Towards the Definition of Culture and
On Poetry and Poets do show Eliot speaking as if with an authoritative
understanding of the culture in which he was writing, and of the place of
literature within it, we read them as a protest against the fact that only
remnants of that culture looked likely to have survived the war. He never
returned to the religious perspective on time and timeliness that, in the
paced repetitions of ‘a time for living and for generation’, ‘The time of
the seasons and the constellations’, ‘A time for the evening under lamp-
light’, had been evoked throughout ‘East Coker’, as a response to the
sense that ‘As we grow older j The world becomes stranger’.
12 T. S. Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (1948; London 1962) pp. 19, 17.
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We have seen that Graves’s disparaging remarks about Eliot’s standing
did not earn their place in his 1958 book on account of their accuracy as
reflections on Eliot’s status or authority. Their assertability was owing, not
to their truth, but to their success in articulating an established anxiety –
one that Eliot himself was alive to – concerning the fact that the role of
‘presiding bard’ was an unfilled one at a moment when it was especially
desirable that the role be filled.
There were, of course, established theorists, some of whom, like Lionel
Trilling, were willing to pass judgement on ‘the crisis of our culture’.
Northrop Frye, in Toronto, and G. Wilson Knight (in Leeds but also with a
Toronto connection, having spent the decade leading up to the war there),
were keen to elucidate the relation of local literature to its global and his-
torical contexts. But works such as Frye’s 1957 Anatomy of Criticism sought to
situate works of literature relative to timeless mythic schemes of plots and
archetypes. They were not concerned with poetry’s place in the particular
social context of the late 1950s. Nor did the emerging cultural semiotics of
continental Europe attempt to give an account of the contemporary cul-
tural role of poetry. Roland Barthes’s 1957 Mythologies was concerned with
current social significance, but primarily with the significance of such
phenomena as all-in wrestling, fashion, and the health effects of wine.
The influence of these various works was such that their combined
effect was to make it seem either quaintly parochial, or else staid and
snobbish, to concern oneself with anxieties about the present role of
poetry in culture, and in our understanding of the modern mind. And yet
such anxieties were pressing. They were pressing on Graves, in his unfair
remarks on Eliot. They were pressing on Eliot, in his preface reasserting
his remarks on cultural decline, and on Davie, in the ambivalent ‘hope’
with which he declared that poetry had reached ‘the end of an era’.
They were all the more pressing because it was not only from the under-
standing of psychology that the literary critic of 1958 seemed suddenly to
have been alienated, but also from the project of understanding society
more generally. Sociology, especially in its more anthropological moments,
had long taken the study of language as a paradigm. It is therefore no sur-
prise that a diluted version of the technical apparatus that Chomsky had
introduced to the study of language immediately established itself as a para-
digm for the explanation of cultural phenomena more generally.
In the structural anthropology of Claude Le´vi-Strauss – as presented in
his 1958 book Anthropologie structurale – the anthropologist’s job is under-
stood to be a variety of syntactic analysis which, exactly as with
Chomsky’s treatment of generative grammar, is primarily a formal matter,
to be achieved by an abstract description of the information-handling
mechanisms from which social structures emerge. This point is one that
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Le´vi-Strauss was later to be quite explicit about. Without mentioning
Chomsky by name, he adopts a recognisably Chomskian stance when, in
the ‘overture’ to The Raw and the Cooked, he sets out the explanatory aims
that characterise his approach by telling us that ‘Syntax does not wait
until it has been possible to enumerate a theoretically unlimited series of
events before becoming manifest, because syntax consists in the body of
rules which presides over the generation of those events. And it is precisely
a syntax of South American mythology that I wanted to outline.13
Here, as before, the formal vocabulary of syntactic rules and generative
grammars introduces formal explanatory standards to the human sciences,
and thereby eschews the hermeneutic standards of narrative coherence,
sympathy, and cogency. Just as Anscombe’s 1958 article protested that the
resulting philosophy of psychology was inadequate for understanding
moral phenomena, so we find the equally Wittgensteinian philosopher
Peter Winch mounting a protest against a larger application of these
explanatory standards to social phenomena more generally.
The arguments of Winch’s 1958 book, The Idea of Social Science and its
Relation to Philosophy, position him in direct opposition to the structuralist
who, like Le´vi-Strauss, wants to provide an explanation of social phenom-
ena by using purely formal syntactic tools, analogous to those that
Chomsky was deploying in linguistics. The narrative and hermeneutic
virtues that such explanatory aspirations abandon were, in Winch’s
account, essential if our explanations are to provide understanding at all:
the central concepts which belong to our understanding of social life
are incompatible with concepts central to the activity of scientific pre-
diction. When we speak of the possibility of scientific prediction of
social developments of this sort, we literally do not understand what
we are saying. We cannot understand it, because it has no sense.14
Winch was writing at the very same time as Chomsky, Broadbent, and
Le´vi-Strauss. He was not responding to them but to the general turn of
thought that they embodied. It is this same turn of thought – the aban-
donment of the attempt to explain human phenomena by narrating them,
and the establishment of attempts to explain those phenomena with the
abstract deductive framework of a purely formal system – that we have
discerned as a motivation in the exactly contemporary work of
13 Claude Le´vi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked, trans. Johnand Doreen
Wightman (New York 1969), p. 16.
14 Peter Winch, The Idea of Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (Abingdon
1958) p. 88.
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Anscombe, Davie, and Graves. It was an idea that made an impact
outside academe, more or less immediately.
IV
It was in an article published in The New Statesman in 1956, and in a pair
of articles published in The Sunday Times in 1957, that C. P. Snow first
drew the attention of a wider public to the potentially unhappy dis-
sociation between literary culture and the new developments of science.
These articles appeared in high-profile venues, and similar ideas were
being presented elsewhere by others, but in 1956 and 1957, as Snow
would later write, ‘none of us got much of a response’. In 1959 Snow
gave the definitive treatment of this topic in his Rede lecture on ‘The Two
Cultures and the Scientific Revolution’. This time, although the public
profile of the venue was much lower, the response was a famously noisy
one, and seemed disproportionate to the lecture by which it was provoked.
Snow himself tells us that ‘By the end of the first year I began to feel
uncomfortably like the sorcerer’s apprentice. Articles, references, letters,
blame, praise, were floating in – often from countries where I was other-
wise unknown’.15
After 1964, when F. R. Leavis entered the debate as spokesman for
those who opposed Snow, the suddenly raised profile of Snow’s concerns
can be partly attributed to the allure of rhetorical savagery. Starting a
fight remains a depressingly reliable way to get attention, in the academy
as elsewhere. Leavis’s February 1964 lecture ‘Two Cultures? The
Significance of Lord Snow’ (later published in The Spectator) continues to
attract attention, and not only from academics, for its accusations that
Snow has ‘an utter lack of intellectual distinction, and an embarrassing
vulgarity of style’, and for its claim that Snow is ‘utterly without a
glimmer of what creative literature is, or why it matters’.
The level of Leavis’s vituperation seemed stagey even to commentators at
the time. Writing in 1962, in his ‘London Letter’ for the Hudson Review,
John Wain explained the profile of Leavis and Snow’s debate as being due,
not to the importance of the points that were in contention, but to the
value of the argument as a diversion from the ‘public and private worries’
that characterised the age. In the face of such worries, Wain tells us,
people welcome diversions, and there have been several on the
literary- intellectual scene lately. Much the biggest was a certain judo
demonstration given at Cambridge on February 28th, under the title
15 C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures: And a Second Look (Cambridge 1965) p. 54.
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of the Richmond Lecture, when F. R. Leavis, as if to prove that on
the eve of retirement he has lost none of his skill, threw Sir Charles
Snow over his shoulder several times and then jumped on him. . . .
Such echoes as reached the man in the street appear to have con-
firmed him in his belief that ‘intellectuals’ are people who spend all
their time indulging in passionate feuds of obscure motivation.16
Wain is surely right that Leavis’s lecture had some value as a public diver-
sion from the public and private anxieties of the moment, but Wain’s
characterisation of those anxieties leaves it obscure as to why a debate
about literary culture should provide the distraction that those worries call
for. The ‘public worries’, on Wain’s account, were ‘(1) physical survival,
(2) economic survival, (3) social welfare and (4) education’. The private
ones were ‘whether we are getting lung cancer from cigarettes, and in
general how to get more love and money’. Snow’s own account of the fact
that his 1959 lecture ‘produced a hubbub’, whereas his 1957 articles went
unremarked, does not even go as far as Wain in explaining why this
should have been: Snow tells us that something culturally important was
rather suddenly going on, but for him this shift is merely ‘a reminder of
the mysterious operation of what, in the nineteenth century, was reverently
referred to as the Zeitgeist’.17
We can make Snow’s encounter with this operation of the zeitgeist
rather less mysterious, and can even make the extent of Leavis’s vitupera-
tion seem somewhat less baffling, by seeing both in the light of the expla-
natory revisions that coincided with them (which I considered above), and
by seeing these in the light of the logical discoveries that underpinned
them (which I shall consider shortly). But to understand the way in which
these logical developments were able to exert their cultural influence so
widely and so suddenly, we need first to note the extraordinary context of
technological innovation in which they occurred.
V
The most assertively trumpeted technological innovations in 1958 were
those of nuclear physics and space exploration. In October 1956
Queen Elizabeth had opened the UK’s first nuclear power station –
the facility at Calder Hall – serving primarily to produce plutonium
for the military (as had previous nuclear facilities) but also serving,
16 John Wain, ‘London Letter’, Hudson Review, 15/2 (1962) p. 253.
17 Snow, The Two Cultures, p. 54.
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unlike its predecessors, as a source of electricity for civil use. The devel-
opment of the Calder Hall facility led to the 1957 White Paper Capital
Investment in the Coal, Gas and Electricity Industries. The political decisions
taken on the basis of that paper led to the Nuclear Installations Act
(which eventually passed into law in July 1959) and so gave nuclear
physics a central place in UK energy policy.
The rapid development of nuclear energy facilities in these years
took place conspicuously, and loomed large in the public consciousness.
The technological innovations employed by the nuclear facilities were
celebrated. In the boy’s weekly Eagle, for example, sectioned drawings
were published explaining the Calder Hall plant’s design and oper-
ation.18 The consequences of nuclear developments were also widely
feared. Despite government efforts to manage the public image of the
nuclear industry, concerns about its safety had their own vivid images
to accompany them. The fire at the Windscale nuclear reactor in
October 1957 could not be kept from the public’s attention, since the
resulting fallout required the milk from nearby farms to be seized and,
for several weeks, dumped into the Irish Sea. In February 1958, the
first public meeting of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament took
place. In April that year the first of the Aldermaston protest marches
took place. These were the ‘public fears about survival’ that Wain
identified as the backdrop for the Leavis–Snow debate.
The same years saw the Soviet Union enjoying its most conspicuous suc-
cesses with the Sputnik programme. Sputnik I was launched in October
1957 and fell back into the atmosphere in January 1958. As if that weren’t
enough to catch the public’s imagination, Sputnik II – carrying Laika the
dog – was launched in November 1957 and re-entered the atmosphere –
complete with her remains – in April the following year.
These innovations not only affected the public attitude to science, they
also affected the public attitude to the status and authority of the scientist.
Again, the response was an ambivalent one. The high-profile developments
of nuclear physics and space exploration had established it as common
knowledge that the latest technological developments were developments
on which the future of society would depend, but also that they were devel-
opments that could be properly understood only by those possessed of an
expertise the acquisition of which required devotion to topics that lay
outside the range of those that are represented and celebrated in the
received culture. In the US an article from the October 1958 edition of
18 See Adrian Ham and Robert Hall, A Way Forward for Nuclear Power (UK
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2006).
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Popular Science excitedly reports on a ‘multimillion-dollar crash program . . .
to perfect wholly new ways of teaching high school physics’. One of the top
five distinctive features listed for the new course is that ‘Great pains are
taken to “build an image” of the physicist as a hard-working citizen with
an interesting and valuable – but not queer – job ’.19
In the last of these aims this education programme was only just too
late. The OED lists a 1957 letter by Jack Kerouac as the first instance for
sense 2 of ‘geek’, as meaning: ‘An overly diligent, unsociable student; any
unsociable person obsessively devoted to a particular pursuit’.
It was these suspiciously regarded practitioners of esoteric sciences (or,
more accurately, of the newly esoteric engineering) that Snow had in mind
when he wrote ‘If I were to risk a piece of shorthand I should say that
naturally they had the future in their bones.’ Leavis, of course, was having
none of that:
he says ‘they have the future in their bones’. He clearly feels that it
has an idiosyncratic speech-raciness that gives his wisdom a genial
authority. But it is a basic cliche´ . . . Such a phrase as ‘they have the
future in their bones’ (and Snow repeats it) cannot be explained as a
meaningful proposition, and in that sense has no meaning.20
Leavis moves rapidly here from the accusation that Snow’s language
cannot be ‘explained as expressing a meaningful proposition’, and so is lit-
erally meaningless, to the charge that Snow cannot even be credited with
the having of a thought: ‘though Snow clearly feels that he is expressing
thought, the thought, considered even for a moment, is seen to be a mere
phantom’. The criteria for having thought that such an argument requires
are absurdly stringent. It cannot really have been Snow’s failure to express
a proposition that Leavis was so upset about. Nor can it simply have been
Snow’s verdict that the future state of society depended on work by the
practitioners of the rapidly developing and increasingly esoteric sciences.
That much was obvious. We have seen that even Robert Graves agreed
with it, and Leavis himself acknowledges as much:
the advance of science and technology means a human future of
change so rapid and of such kinds, of tests and challenges so unprece-
dented, of decisions and possible non-decisions so momentous and
19 Popular Science (Oct. 1958) p. 143.
20 F. R. Leavis, Nor Shall My Sword (London 1972) p. 51.
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insidious in their consequences, that mankind – this is surely clear –
will need to be in full intelligent possession of its full humanity.21
Nineteen fifty-eight’s militarily important developments of nuclear power
and of space exploration gave undeniable currency to the idea that the
advance of the esoteric sciences would be of the first importance. But it
was not these alone that raised a challenge for our conception of what it is
to be in ‘full intelligent possession of our full humanity’. The most conse-
quential innovations, from that perspective, were those that led Jack Kilby,
working in September 1958 in the labs of Texas Instruments, to the devel-
opment of the first integrated circuit.
Like much of the research conducted by Texas Instruments, the devel-
opment of the integrated circuit was naturally understood as being a con-
tribution to the arms race on which military survival might have come to
depend, but it was also immediately recognised as leading to a rapid
acceleration of progress in the project of automatising computations, and
so as adding new urgency to the need to find a cultural understanding of
our relationship with computers.
That need was already well established in 1950 (even before Alan
Turing’s seminal article on ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, pub-
lished in Mind in October of that year). An article from Time magazine in
January 1950 had reported on the prospects for developments in comput-
ing to create a ‘“second industrial revolution”, which will devalue the
human brain as the first industrial revolution devalued the human arm’.
The article maintains a more or less neutral stance on the question of
whether such a revolution is likely to be imminent, but it does warn that
‘Nearly all the computermen are worried about the effect the machines
will have on society.’ By December 1958 the introduction of subscriber
dialling to UK telephone exchanges had made it common knowledge that
the implementation of communication theory allowed at least some
humans – the telephone operators to whom one had previously spoken
when placing a long-distance call – to be replaced by machines. In that
same year the prospect of humans being replaced by machines more
widely was elevated from journalistic conjecture to practical possibility by
the development of the integrated circuit. And it is in that year too that
we find the first appearance of the idea that such developments in com-
puting power might accelerate to a cataclysmic ‘technological singularity’.
This idea seems first to have appeared in a conversation between John
von Neumann and the Manhattan Project physicist Stanislaw Ulam,
21 Ibid., p. 60.
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recounted by Ulam in his memorial notice for von Neumann, published
that May:
One conversation centered on the ever accelerating progress of tech-
nology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the
appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of
the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not
continue.22
Von Neumann knew well that there were logical limits to the intelligent
capacities that any information technology could achieve, but the nature
and source of these limits was such as to compound the anxiety resulting
from the establishment of formal methods in the human sciences. The
limits in question follow from Go¨del’s 1931 proof of the incompleteness of
arithmetic.
VI
The significance of Go¨del’s work in the present context depends on the
consequences of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for ‘Hilbert’s
Programme’ in the foundations of mathematics. Hilbert had aspired to
solve the so-called Entscheidengsproblem, by showing that every truth about
real numbers could be derived by applying precisely formulated inference
rules to a finite set of axioms. For Hilbert, working at the end of the nine-
teenth century, the success of this programme would have been epistemi-
cally reassuring. By 1958 it would also have been somewhat unsettling for
the professional mathematician, since the application of precisely formu-
lated inference rules to finite sets to axioms was by then the sort of thing
that computers were very good at. In 1957 Alan Newell, J. C. Shaw, and
Herbert Simon had published the results of their attempts to build a
‘Logic Theory Machine’.23 They had thereby demonstrated that some bits
of formal reasoning could indeed by implemented mechanically. In the
summer of 1958 Martin Davis and Hilary Putnam developed the compu-
tational methods that would enable automated deduction to be usefully
applied to a broad range of logical and mathematical problems.24 The
22 Stanislaw Ulam, ‘John vonBeumann: 1903–1957’, Bulletin of the American
Mathematical Society, 64/3 part2 (1958) p. 5.
23 A. Newell, J. C. Shaw, and H. A. Simon, ‘Empirical Exploration of the Logic
Theory Machine: A Case Study in Heuristics’, Papers Presented at the February 1957
Western Joint Computer Conference: Techniques for Reliability (1957) p. 218.
24 Martin Davis and Hilary Putnam, Computational Methods in the Propositional
Calculus (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 1958).
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success of Hilbert’s programme would therefore have led to an unsettling
conclusion: It would have shown that – in so far as it is the job of mathe-
maticians to uncover truths about the real numbers – mathematicians
could have been replaced by computers.
Fortunately for the mathematicians, no such threat ever needed to be
taken seriously since 1958’s innovations made the mechanical implemen-
tation of formal computations into a practical possibility only after it had
been established, as an immediate consequence of Go¨del’s Second
Incompleteness Theorem, that Hilbert’s programme could not be success-
fully carried through.
This, as Go¨del himself had realised, did not entail that mathematical
proof was entirely beyond the scope of computation. In his now cele-
brated 1956 letter to the dying von Neumann, Go¨del notes that, if the
function specifying the maximum number of steps required by a machine
to determine whether there is a proof of length n for any formula of the
predicate calculus were a function that grew no faster than n or n2, then
‘it would have very important consequences. It would apparently mean
that in spite of the unsolvability of the Entscheidengsproblem, the reasoning
of mathematicians about yes-or-no questions can be completely replaced
by machines . . . It seems quite possible to me that [this function] grows
slowly.’
The question of whether this function does indeed grow slowly is the P
vs NP question, and it is this unanswered puzzle that lies at the heart of
current computational complexity theory. For as long as this question
remains unanswered it will continue to be plausible that a lot of the think-
ing that mathematicians do is thinking of a sort that no computer could
implement, or even check. And even if it turned out that the function
Go¨del mentions does grow slowly – and that would be a very surprising
result indeed – the incompleteness theorems would still guarantee that
some mathematical facts lie beyond the scope of what any machine could
discover. The mathematicians of 1958 therefore enjoyed a logical guaran-
tee that their domain was one that computers could not master.
Scientists were in a similar position, although they were somewhat less
comfortable to be there. Throughout the 1940s, Rudolph Carnap, Carl
Hempel, and others had been attempting to do for scientific reasoning
what Hilbert had wanted to do for mathematics, and what Frege had
done successfully for deductive logic, namely, to assuage worries emerging
from the unprecedentedly revisionary innovations of preceding decades
by giving a systematic account of the sort of reasoning involved in the
making of such innovations, and by giving that account in such a way as
to allow the validity of the reasoning in question to be demonstrated with
purely formal methods. With the publication in 1954 of Nelson
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Goodman’s Fact, Fiction and Forecast, it had become clear that there were
difficulties of principle, not merely technical obstacles, that had thwarted
these efforts.
What Goodman’s work made clear was that any formal account of the
confirmation relation between data and hypothesis was bound to fail. His
‘New Riddle of Induction’ showed that a set of data that confirms one
hypothesis could fail to confirm an alternative hypothesis, despite the fact
that that alternative has exactly the same logical form as its rival, and
stands in exactly the same formal relation to those data. From this it
follows that whatever confirmatory work might be accomplished by the
inductive reasoning with which a scientist moves from knowledge of some
data to a belief in the truth, or in the probability, of his theory, it is not
work that this reasoning is able to accomplish by virtue of its form.
Attempts to use a formal account of induction to assuage any doubts
about the rational status of scientific reasoning were therefore bound to
fail.
This result was not unanticipated. As early as 1929 Jan Łukasiewicz
had suggested that research on inductive reasoning was unlikely to result
in a formalised logic of induction. Łukasiewicz took this to be a good
thing for the scientist’s self-conception. A Hempel-style attempt to give a
formal account of scientific reasoning, in his view, ‘undermines the free
intuition of a scientist’.
By the end of the 1950s these ideas had a new significance (although
Łukasiewicz’s contribution to them went unacknowledged, largely
because the 1958 second edition of his logic textbook omitted the appen-
dix in which these ideas were developed). Again, the significance was
owing to the fact that by 1958 it was true for the first time that syntactic
algorithms for conducting formal reasoning could feasibly be
implemented by mechanical computers, using only the technological
resources that were then available. Łukasiewicz and Hempel’s question
of whether scientific reasoning was formalisable, or whether it involved a
free play of (epistemically questionable) ‘intuition’, had therefore become
a way to ask whether such reasoning could be implemented in a compu-
ter or whether, in the course of scientific reasoning, scientists exercise
aspects of their humanity that distinguish them from such a machine.
The effect of Goodman’s work on the impossibility of giving a syntactic
account of induction was therefore to suggest that scientific reasoning is
provably different in kind from anything a computer could accomplish.
The epistemic credentials of scientific reasoning were thereby left
without a formal corroboration, but the essential humanity of the scien-
tists’ practice was, by that same token, confirmed.
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VII
These epistemological and logical points provide the foundations for the
account of science that Michael Polanyi elaborated in his 1958 book,
Personal Knowledge. Polanyi understood science to be an authoritative source
of knowledge, but only after proposing some radical revisions to our philo-
sophical conception of what knowledge consists in and requires. With their
emphasis on the scientist as ‘skillful’ (chapter 4), ‘passionate’ (chapter 6),
‘convivial’ (chapter 7), and ‘committed’ (chapter 10), these revisions break
with the austere Hempelian ideal of formalisability in ways that were by no
means unattractive.
Polanyi probes a number of ideas that have recently been enjoying
popularity in feminist epistemology, and in some strands of the philosophy
of mind, where they are characterised as ‘embodied’, ‘enactive’, or ‘per-
formative’. His view was that we should
regard knowing as an active comprehension of the things known, an
action that requires skill. Skillful knowing and doing is performed by
subordinating a set of particulars, as clues or tools, to the shaping of
a skillful achievement, whether practical or theoretical . . . Clues and
tools are things used as such and not observed in themselves. They
are made to function as extensions of our bodily equipment and this
involves a certain change of our own being.25
It is crucial for Polanyi, as for the more recent theorists whose work he
anticipates, that the knowledge that figures in this ‘skillful knowing and
doing’ is independent of the knowledge that is explicitly stated in the
scientist’s textbooks or lectures. Polanyi’s handling of this point has been
somewhat overshadowed by the treatment that it later received from
Thomas Kuhn.26 For Kuhn, the lack of an explicit formulation of the
information that skilled mastery encodes is taken to be essential for its
playing of an epistemically foundational role. In this connection Kuhn
cites Polanyi, but his reasons seem rather to have been Wittgensteinian.
(The influence of Wittgenstein was high at the time, thanks in part to the
interest generated by the publication, in 1958, of his Blue and Brown Books.)
Polanyi’s own presentation of this point is without Kuhn’s Wittgensteinian
sympathies. For him the importance of the inexplicitness of the knowledge
that our skills embody is not that it makes this knowledge epistemically
25 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London
1959) p. vii.
26 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 1962).
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foundational, but that it makes the transmission of such knowledge essen-
tially cultural, in ways that depend on authority and tradition:
An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be transmitted by
prescription, since no prescription for it exists. It can be passed on
only from master to apprentice . . . To learn by example is to submit
to authority . . . A society which wants to preserve a fund of personal
knowledge must submit to tradition.27
Polanyi thereby gives us a conception of scientific knowledge as being
achieved through practices which are heroic, convivial, epistemically repu-
table, and essentially cultural. This conception, as I have emphasised, was
founded on logical theorems pertaining to the limits of computation and
the formalisability of induction. The literary establishment of 1958 was
lacking the resources to frame such a self-conception, but it was very
much concerned with examining the relations of authority and tradition
that bring Polanyi’s knowledge-transmitting cultures into existence.
VIII
Alan Sillitoe’s 1958 novel Saturday Night and Sunday Morning is representative
of the way in which these concerns were treated in literary contexts. The
most nuanced of the relationships in ‘Saturday Night’ (the first, and much
the longest, of the novel’s two sections) is the relationship between Arthur,
the young protagonist, and Jack, the sympathetic older colleague at the
bicycle factory where he works. Arthur is not without respect for Jack. It
is his opinion that ‘Jack is a good bloke. One of the best.’28 But theirs is
very far from being an apprentice–craftsman relationship of the sort that
Polanyi tells us is essentially tradition-creating, and essential for the trans-
mission of tacit knowledge: for the greater part of the novel Arthur is
sleeping with Jack’s wife, with the full knowledge of Jack’s children, and
perhaps with less than total ignorance on the part of Jack himself. For
much of the novel he is sleeping with her sister too.
Sexual mores also serve as a microcosm in which to gauge the gains and
losses of the new liberation of individuals from the strictures of tradition
and authority in Iris Murdoch’s 1958 novel, The Bell. (Nor was this a theme
confined to fiction – 1958 also being the year in which Paul Raymond
opened Raymond’s Revuebar, and the year in which the Obscene
Publications Bill was first debated.) Imber Court, the fledgling Christian lay
27 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 53.
28 Alan Sillitoe, Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (London 1958) p. 36.
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community on whose fate Murdoch’s novel centres, is animated by the diffi-
culties of negotiating the individual’s relation to tradition ab initio. It is in
part because there is no shared knowledge transmitted through the make-
shift cultural rituals of the Imber Court community that the development of
that community’s life is stunted at a stage that falls short of the self-
sufficiency to which its members aspire. And it is this lack of any implicit
knowledge embodied in the life of the community’s cultural norms that
leaves the community without the sort of self-sustaining life that might have
reinforced it against those shifts in the balance of its members’ various
mutual affections that force its eventual collapse.
Similar themes were presented on the stage. The vulnerability and social
displacement that put Alison at the centre of the drama in John Osborne’s
Look Back in Anger (first staged at the Royal Court in 1956, first filmed in
1958) are presented partly as resulting from the impossibility of participating
in the existing tradition without being stifled by its anachronism. This is
especially clear in Alison’s relation to her father – ‘the Colonel’ – who
implicitly understands himself and his motives, even in so far as these
pertain to his family, against the background of a received social role.
All three of these works had a high-profile reception, but it was Look
Back in Anger that was most immediately recognised as being part of larger
trend. In the theatre that trend was centred on George Devine’s English
Stage Company, founded at the Royal Court in 1956. It was a trend that
moved away from the version of theatre that had depended on the big
heroic performances to which Lawrence Olivier, John Gielgud, and
Ralph Richardson had owed their fame in the preceding decades.
Instead, the protagonists of plays that were emerging from the Royal
Court achieved their identity through a struggle against the prevailing
social norms. Olivier, with his performance as Archie Rice in Osborne’s
The Entertainer (on stage in 1957 and on film in 1960), proved himself
capable of taking on these roles. But his ability to do so seems now to be
a testament to his versatility. The characters that were being depicted in
English theatres in the final years of the 1950s were, for British audiences,
of a quite different type from what had gone before.
The shift was not only a shift towards ‘kitchen sink’ drama. The plight of
the tramps in Waiting for Godot (first staged in 1952, and in English in 1955)
lends itself – especially in their encounter with the class-stereotype figures
of Pozzo and Lucky – to interpretation as an allegory for the state of
postwar culture more generally. But by the time we get to Krapp’s Last Tape
(first staged in 1958), any attempt to read Beckett’s work as a cultural alle-
gory seems to be seeking an excuse to look past the bleakness of its depic-
tion of a very definitely individual self. Osborne’s and Sillitoe’s domestic
dramas are only one part of a literary movement concerned with shifts in
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the social foundations required for the convivial, committed heroism that
Polanyi takes to be essential for the cultural business of transmitting and
creating tacit knowledge, and which Beckett’s Krapp, Osborne’s Jimmy
Porter, and Murdoch’s Nick Fawley are so devastatingly without.
IX
By 1958, then, scientists could point to the work of Hempel, of
Goodman, and of Polanyi to show that their activities were uncomputable,
but were instead essentially convivial and cultural. Mathematicians could
point to Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem, and to Turing’s work on the
Entscheidengsproblem, to show that what they did in making mathematical
discoveries was something that no computer could do. Poets – as we have
seen Donald Davie intimate – had nothing compelling to say.
Chomsky’s new approach in linguistics was reviving the idea that in
understanding the basis of language we are understanding intellectual
capacities that are distinctively human. But the way in which Chomsky
approached the task of understanding the human capacity for language,
in the first chapters of Syntactic Structures, was by using the purely formal
resources of information theory to prove results about the sorts of compu-
tational system that could and that could not be capable of producing
well-formed English sentences.
In Leavis’s first response to Snow’s 1959 lecture, the idea that human
language might be computationally implemented is explicit only in one of
Leavis’s cheaper shots against Snow’s status as a novelist (a shot so cheap
that Leavis actually distances himself from it):
as a novelist he doesn’t exist; he doesn’t begin to exist . . . The nonen-
tity is apparent on every page of his fictions . . . I am trying to remem-
ber where I heard (can I have dreamed it?) that they are composed
for him by an electronic brain called Charlie, into which the instruc-
tions are fed in the form of the chapter-headings.29
In the 1972 volume in which Leavis collected his various complaints
against Snow, the idea of computationally implementing the human
capacity for linguistic creativity returns, again and again, as a symptom
either of personal stupidity or of some deep cultural flaw:
I was, I confess, a little amused when, sitting at a formal lunch next
to the director of City Art Gallery, I was told by him, in the tone of
29 Leavis, Nor Shall My Sword, p. 45.
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one saying something very impressive: ‘A computer can write a
poem’ – I replied, very naturally, that I couldn’t accept that, adding
that it was one of the things that I knew to be impossible. When he
responded by being angry, fierce and authoritative, I reflected that he
was German, if an e´migre´, and that in any case his business was
Kunst and he hadn’t said that a computer could paint a work of art.30
Leavis found there to be something obviously deplorable in ‘the cultural
climate that makes it possible for educated persons to assure one that a
computer can write a poem’.31 In this essay we have seen that the con-
ditions that made such a climate possible emerged quite suddenly in
1958. What is remarkable here is not just that Leavis had no way to
respond to such assurances other than by getting chauvinistic and angry
about them, but that it should be the poet, and not the mathematician or
scientist, to whom the acceleration of computational power poses an
unanswerable challenge. Such a predicament would have been unimagin-
able only a few years previously. It was the information theoretic inno-
vations of structuralist linguistics that made it a pressing cultural concern.
30 Ibid., p. 142.
31 Ibid., p. 34.
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